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Learned Hand
John J. Cound*
Learned Hand taught us many things. What he taught us best
was faith in our work: faith that it can be done and is worth doing.
This message Learned Hand's life was to all lawyers. It came
especially loud and clear to those who were his clerks. Haec olim
meminisse iuvabit.
Judge Hand's clerks learned much that was practical: that
judges and courts "are not fungible"; that a clear statement of facts
is the most important part of a brief-to the court, and hence to
counsel also; that stare decisis means more in court than it often
did in the classroom. They learned much too that was interesting:
tales of presidents and justices; legal ditties; and a score of fetching epithets. They learned a lot of law. Transcending these things,
however, they learned by the most direct contact the old truth that
man can live greatly in the law. For they had seen one of profound wisdom and wide knowledge, after decades of similar labors,
face each new question with a fresh and ungrudging response, and
find his reward in its resolution according to his reason. They learned too that wisdom and knowledge have their doubts, more unsetling perhaps in proportion to their depth and breadth; but they
saw that doubts do not excuse (nor need they tempt) one from
the task. The mind of a Hand is unique. But the ends to which he
worked are open to all, and I do not believe that anyone could
talk at length with Learned Hand and come away with his own
philosophy unscathed.
As complex a structure as the judicial philosophy of Learned
Hand certainly cannot be broken down into a few constituents.
Yet frequent recurrence lends special significance to these three:
a regard for craftsmanship, a belief in reason, and a doubt as
to the absolute validity of any conclusion.
I
... in all chosen jobs the craftsman must be at work, and the crafts-

man, as Stevenson says, gets his hire as he goes.'

*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Law Clerk to Judge Learned
Hand, 1952-1953.
1. HAND, The Preservationof Personality, in THE SPIRT OF LBERTY 30,

44 (Dilliard ed. 1953), originally published in 7 BRYN MAR ALUMNAE
BULL. 7 (1927). See also HAND, THE BiLL OF RiGHTS 77 (1958); Hand,
Mr. Justice Holmes, 43 IH.v. L. REv. 857, 860-62 (1930).
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The value which Learned Hand attached to skilled performance
arose in part, I am sure, from an aesthetic sense. His career refutes
any suggestion of dilettantism, of infatuated adherence to form or
concept. Yet were law nothing more than the stuff of conditioned
response or ad hoc choice, his nature would have had none of it.
Hand's story of Holmes telling him that "it's not my business" to
"do justice" has been widely repeated. Even more revealing is the
relish with which he recounted Holmes' story on the same occasion: Holmes had argued a case before the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, relying upon a careful exposition of the accepted
law, only to have the decision rendered against him on grounds of
"public policy." The judge who had written the opinion, meeting
Holmes a few days afterwards, congratulated him upon the skill of
his argument. "Your honor," replied Holmes, "I came at you with
an 6p6e; you hit me over the head with a sack of potatoes."
Hand's regard for craftsmanship, however, had deeper roots than
these. His skepticism prevented him from forming any judgment
as to man's cosmic significance, yet he cared deeply for man and
could not deny him any meaning whatsoever. Man's meaning then
is what he does. His work becomes indistinguishable from his
reality. In lines almost mystic, Hand says:
Even this obdurate and recalcitrant world is perhaps in the end no
more than a complicated series of formulae which we impose upon the

flux. If so, we are throughout its builders, unconscious but always at
work. In part at any rate, we consciously compose; and as we do, a
happy fortuity gives us the sense of our own actuality, an escape from
the effort to escape, a contentment that the mere stream of consciousness cannot bring, a direction, a solace, a power and a philosophy.2

II
A ready acquiescence in unsound reasoning for the sake of an immediate end vulgarizes our whole rational life .

. .

. [A] right result

reached
by unsound reasons gives no assurance of permanent acquisition. 3

A disciple of Holmes, Hand had no illusion that the law is
"nothing else but reason," divorced from a world of past and present facts. Indeed a hyperlogical decision was apt to set him to
chanting the Lord Chancellor's verse: "The Law is the true embodiment of everything that's excellent . . . ." But to reason pragmatically is certainly not to refuse to reason at all. Nor does it en2. HAND, The Preservation of Personality, in THE SPMIT OF LiBERTY 30,
44 (Dilliard ed. 1953).

3. Hand, Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the Teaching of Law?, 5 AM. L. SCHOOL REV. 621, 623-24 (1926).
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tail the rejection of precedent as a consideration or symmetry
as a value. Judge Hand's contribution to the growth of American
law, which is more than considerable, demonstrates that to assert
the validity of this consideration and this value may be to argue
not for a static law, but for a law which progresses within and
strengthens the existing corpus. Progress so conditioned not only
guards against fiat, but subjects old law and new to the constant
gaze of reason.
Concerned as he was with the pattern of the law, Hand did not
accept the notion that a judicial opinion is only a rationalization
for a result otherwise reached. That he had a pride of style is
obvious. But as nearly as he could make them do so, I believe,
his opinions reflected the mental processes by which he had reached his result. The related doctrine that all results are foreordained
by the preconceptions of the judge he flatly rejected:
There are those who insist that detachment is an illusion; that our
conclusions, when their bases are sifted, always reveal a passional
foundation. Even so; though they be throughout the creatures of past
emotional experience, it does not follow that that experience can
never predispose us to impartiality. A bias against bias may be as likely
a result of some buried crisis, as any other bias. Be that as it may, we
know that men do differ widely in this capacity; and the incredulity
which seeks to discredit that knowledge is a part of the crusade against
reason from which we have already so bitterly suffered.4
I
He who supposes that he can be certain of the result is the least
fitted for the attempt.5

Judge Hand's belief in reason as a source of law, and his distrust of his own reason's results seem paradoxical at first. Yet
they are logically conjoined. He who is least certain is most likely
to be receptive to reason. He who is most receptive to reason is
least likely to embrace those brethren of certainty-the absolute,
the general principle, the formula and the controlling concept. The
4. Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 172 (1947).
During the year I worked for Judge Hand, he sat-except in one caseonly with Thomas Swan and Jerome Frank. If judges were not amenable
to reason which is opposed to their preconceptions, I would think that
despite their high mutual regard for one another the diverse experience,
temperament and views of these three would have weakened their joint
effort. My impression was that on the contrary the diversity was a source of
strength, and that indeed no better three-judge panel ever sat. Even where
differences occurred, the effect, it seems to me, was to produce more thoughtful analysis and expression than would otherwise have been the case. See,
e.g., Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F.2d 88, 96, 99 (2d Cir.
1953) (L. Hand, J., concurring; Frank, J., dissenting).
5. United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952).
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inquiring mind will continue to inquire. To the extent that this
skepticism occasioned a re-examination of received learning we owe
to it much of Learned Hand's contribution to our law, and common consensus would stamp it a healthy doubt.

Unquestionably, however, Hand's distrust of judicial wisdom
also played a major role in his approach to the question of judicial review on which the consensus is not unanimous. Even in
that rare instance when he found an unconstitutional assertion of
power he was unable to take refuge in one of the comforting
placebos common to the time:
It would be, I think, disingenuous to pretend that the ratio decidendi
of such decisions is susceptible of statement in general principles.
That no doubt might give a show of necessity to the conclusion, but
it would be insincere and illusory, and appears formidable only in
case the conclusion is surreptitiously introduced during the reasoning. 6

But of course it is Dennis (and The Bill of Rights), and not
Schechter that have evoked the major criticism, though we cannot
be sure with respect to the political freedoms how much his position is due to a belief that however skilled the court our democratic
commitment leaves these questions in elected hands.'
This is not an occasion for a study of the appropriate scope of
judicial review in cases involving freedom of expression. For myself I would mark the question at present one of doubt. It may be
6. United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 625 (2d
Cir. 1935) (concurring opinion, representing the majority of the court on
this issue).
I once asked Judge Hand whether this was, as I had been told, the only
case in which he had held an act of Congress unconstitutional. He snorted,
"It wasn't an act, it was a regulation." Then in candor he told me of his
Harvard professor (Gray, I believe) who having said that no state took a
certain position, replied to a student who pointed out Kentucky, "That's not
a state; it's a commonwealth."
7. Judge Hand's views as to the difference in point of view of necessity
and desirability between judicial review of statutes dealing with the allocation of powers among governmental units and judicial review of statutes
challenged under the first, fifth and fourteenth amendments, is of course
the major substance of THE BILL Op RIGHTS (1958).
In connection with this book, I would like to speak to a misapprehension
held by many. Judge Hand has been criticized for the stand he took there.
This is to be expected. But many have read them as an attack on the Supreme Court as presently constituted or even on a particular decision or
decisions. I think it worth noting that what he said there he had frequently
said before over many years; moreover that he had been planning these
lectures over a long period. He had expressed to me (as I am sure he had
to earlier clerks) his intention of saying just about what he did say. Indeed, he said that he feared he could really add nothing to Thayer's The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, in 7
Harvard Law Review 129, published in 1893. I cannot regard the date of
the lectures as more than happenstance.
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that the idea, represented by Learned Hand, that "the prohibitions
of the First Amendment . . . are 'no more than admonitions of
moderation' . . . has done more to undermine liberty in this country than any other single force."' Perspective demands, however, in
measuring the man who is gone that we remember that by statutory interpretation he cleared for the mails in time of war a magazine which printed the same things for saying which Holmes and
Brandeis affirmed the conviction of Debs under the same statute four months after the war was over. 9
Learned Hand's doubts extended beyond the principles we hold
and argue as lawyers; they dared even to question our importance
and his own. But faith in the craft tradition was always there. In
speaking to the law teachers in 1925, he seems to have spoken to
the entire bar:
The Temple of Justice we think of as especially our own, but its roof
covers more than we can occupy. For Justice is no less than the Good
Life, and we shall have but a small part hibringing that to pass, so
far as it comes. With confidence in the greatness of our share, if
not in the sufficiency of our powers, we must pledge ourselves as
fellow servants in the small precinct which is allotted to us.10

8.

DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE

45 (1958).

9. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246
Fed. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
10. Hand, Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the Teaching of Law?, 5 AM. L. SCHOOL REv. 621, 631 (1926).

